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Abstract
Over the past couple of years, anecdotal evidence has emerged
linking coordinated campaigns by state-sponsored actors with
efforts to manipulate public opinion on the Web, often around
major political events, through dedicated accounts, or “trolls.”
Although they are often involved in spreading disinformation
on social media, there is little understanding of how these trolls
operate, what type of content they disseminate, and most im-
portantly their influence on the information ecosystem.
In this paper, we shed light on these questions by analyz-
ing 27K tweets posted by 1K Twitter users identified as hav-
ing ties with Russia’s Internet Research Agency and thus likely
state-sponsored trolls. We compare their behavior to a random
set of Twitter users, finding interesting differences in terms of
the content they disseminate, the evolution of their account, as
well as their general behavior and use of Twitter. Then, using
Hawkes Processes, we quantify the influence that trolls had on
the dissemination of news on social platforms like Twitter, Red-
dit, and 4chan. Overall, our findings indicate that Russian trolls
managed to stay active for long periods of time and to reach
a substantial number of Twitter users with their tweets. When
looking at their ability of spreading news content and making it
viral, however, we find that their effect on social platforms was
minor, with the significant exception of news published by the
Russian state-sponsored news outlet RT (Russia Today).
1 Introduction
Recent political events and elections have been increasingly ac-
companied by reports of disinformation campaigns attributed
to state-sponsored actors [8]. In particular, “troll farms,” al-
legedly employed by Russian state agencies, have been actively
commenting and posting content on social media to further the
Kremlin’s political agenda [27]. In late 2017, the US Congress
started an investigation on Russian interference in the 2016
US Presidential Election, releasing the IDs of 2.7K Twitter ac-
counts identified as Russian trolls.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the 4th Workshop on The
Fourth Workshop on Computational Methods in Online Misbehavior (Cyber-
Safety 2019) – WWW’19 Companion Proceedings. This is the full version.
Despite the growing relevance of state-sponsored disinfor-
mation, the activity of accounts linked to such efforts has not
been thoroughly studied. Previous work has mostly looked at
campaigns run by bots [8, 11, 23]; however, automated content
diffusion is only a part of the issue, and in fact recent research
has shown that human actors are actually key in spreading false
information on Twitter [25]. Overall, many aspects of state-
sponsored disinformation remain unclear, e.g., how do state-
sponsored trolls operate? What kind of content do they dissem-
inate? And, perhaps more importantly, is it possible to quantify
the influence they have on the overall information ecosystem on
the Web?
In this paper, we aim to address these questions, by relying
on the set of 2.7K accounts released by the US Congress as
ground truth for Russian state-sponsored trolls. From a dataset
containing all tweets released by the 1% Twitter Streaming API,
we search and retrieve 27K tweets posted by 1K Russian trolls
between January 2016 and September 2017. We characterize
their activity by comparing to a random sample of Twitter users.
Then, we quantify the influence of these trolls on the greater
Web, looking at occurrences of URLs posted by them on Twit-
ter, 4chan [12], and Reddit, which we choose since they are
impactful actors of the information ecosystem [34]. Finally, we
use Hawkes Processes [18] to model the influence of each Web
community (i.e., Russian trolls on Twitter, overall Twitter, Red-
dit, and 4chan) on each other.
Main findings. Our study leads to several key observations:
1. Trolls actually bear very small influence in making news
go viral on Twitter and other social platforms alike. A
noteworthy exception are links to news originating from
RT (Russia Today), a state-funded news outlet: indeed,
Russian trolls are quite effective in “pushing” these URLs
on Twitter and other social networks.
2. The main topics discussed by Russian trolls target very
specific world events (e.g., Charlottesville protests) and
organizations (such as ISIS), and political threads related
to Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.
3. Trolls adopt different identities over time, i.e., they “reset”
their profile by deleting their previous tweets and changing
their screen name/information.
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4. Trolls exhibit significantly different behaviors compared
to other (random) Twitter accounts. For instance, the lo-
cations they report concentrate in a few countries like the
USA, Germany, and Russia, perhaps in an attempt to ap-
pear “local” and more effectively manipulate opinions of
users from those countries. Also, while random Twitter
users mainly tweet from mobile versions of the platform,
the majority of the Russian trolls do so via the Web Client.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the social net-
works studied in this paper, i.e., Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan,
which we choose because they are impactful actors on the
Web’s information ecosystem [34].
Twitter. Twitter is a mainstream social network, where users
can broadcast short messages, called “tweets,” to their follow-
ers. Tweets may contain hashtags, which enable the easy index
and search of messages, as well as mentions, which refer to
other users on Twitter.
Reddit. Reddit is a news aggregator with several social fea-
tures. It allows users to post URLs along with a title; posts can
get up- and down- votes, which dictate the popularity and or-
der in which they appear on the platform. Reddit is divided to
“subreddits,” which are forums created by users that focus on a
particular topic (e.g., /r/The Donald is about discussions around
Donald Trump).
4chan. 4chan is an imageboard forum, organized in communi-
ties called “boards,” each with a different topic of interest. A
user can create a new post by uploading an image with or with-
out some text; others can reply below with or without images.
4chan is an anonymous community, and several of its boards
are reportedly responsible for a substantial amount of hateful
content [12]. In this work we focus on the Politically Incor-
rect board (/pol/) mainly because it is the main board for the
discussion of politics and world events. Furthermore, 4chan is
ephemeral, i.e., there is a limited number of active threads and
all threads are permanently deleted after a week.
3 Datasets
Russian trolls. We start from the 2.7K Twitter accounts sus-
pended by Twitter because of connections to Russia’s Internet
Research Agency. The list of these accounts was released by the
US Congress as part of their investigation of the alleged Russian
interference in the 2016 US presidential election, and includes
both Twitter’s user ID (which is a numeric unique identifier as-
sociated to the account) and the screen name.1 From a dataset
storing all tweets released by the 1% Twitter Streaming API,
we search for tweets posted between January 2016 and Septem-
ber 2017 by the user IDs of the trolls. Overall, we obtain 27K
tweets from 1K out of the 2.7K Russian trolls. Note that the
criteria used by Twitter to identify these troll accounts are not
public. What we do know is that this is not the complete set of
1See https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/exhibit b.pdf
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Figure 1: Temporal characteristics of tweets from Russian trolls and
random Twitter users.
active Russian trolls, because 6 days prior to this writing Twitter
announced they have discovered over 1K more troll accounts.2
Nonetheless, it constitutes an invaluable “ground truth” dataset
enabling efforts to shed light on the behavior of state-sponsored
troll accounts.
Baseline dataset. We also compile a list of random Twitter
users, while ensuring that the distribution of the average num-
ber of tweets per day posted by the random users is similar to
the one by trolls. To calculate the average number of tweets
posted by an account, we find the first tweet posted after Jan-
uary 1, 2016 and retrieve the overall tweet count. This number
is then divided by the number of days since account creation.
Having selected a set of 1K random users, we then collect all
their tweets between January 2016 and September 2017, obtain-
ing a total of 96K tweets. We follow this approach as it gives a
good approximation of posting behavior, even though it might
not be perfect, since (1) Twitter accounts can become more or
less active over time, and (2) our datasets are based on the 1%
Streaming API, thus, we are unable to control the number of
tweets we obtain for each account.
4 Analysis
In this section, we present an in-depth analysis of the activities
and the behavior of Russian trolls. First, we provide a general
characterization of the accounts and a geographical analysis of
the locations they report. Then, we analyze the content they
share and how they evolved until their suspension by Twitter.
Finally, we present a case study of one specific account.
4.1 General Characterization
Temporal analysis. We observe that Russian trolls are continu-
ously active on Twitter between January, 2016 and September,
2017, with a peak of activity just before the second US pres-
idential debate (October 9, 2016). Fig. 1(a) shows that most
tweets from the trolls are posted between 14:00 and 15:00 UTC.
In Fig. 1(b), we also report temporal characteristics based on
hour of the week, finding that both datasets follow a diurnal
pattern, while trolls’ activity peaks around 14:00 and 15:00
UTC on Mondays and Wednesdays. Considering that Moscow
is three hours ahead UTC, this distribution does not rule out that
tweets might actually be posted from Russia.
2https://blog.twitter.com/official/en us/topics/company/2018/2016-election-
update.html
2
01/
09
09/
09
05/
10
01/
11
09/
11
05/
12
01/
13
09/
13
05/
14
01/
15
09/
15
05/
16
01/
17
09/
17
0
5
10
15
20
25
# 
of
 a
cc
ou
nt
s c
re
at
ed
Figure 2: Number of Russian troll accounts created per day.
Screen Name Description
Word (%) 4-gram (%) Word (%) Word bigram (%)
news 1.3% news 1.5% news 10.7% follow me 7.8%
bote 1.2% line 1.5% follow 10.7% breaking news 2.6%
online 1.1% blac 1.3% conservative 8.1% news aus 2.1%
daily 0.8% bote 1.3% trump 7.8% uns in 2.1%
today 0.6% rist 1.1% und 6.2% deiner stdt 2.1%
ezekiel2517 0.6% nlin 1.1% maga 5.9% die news 2.1%
maria 0.5% onli 1.0% love 5.8% wichtige und 2.1%
black 0.5% lack 1.0% us 5.3% nachrichten aus 2.1%
voice 0.4% bert 1.0% die 5.0% aus deiner 2.1%
martin 0.4% poli 1.0% nachrichten 4.3% die dn 2.1%
Table 1: Top 10 words found in Russian troll screen names and ac-
count descriptions. We also report character 4-grams for the screen
names and word bigrams for the description.
Account creation. Next, we examine the dates when the trolls
infiltrated Twitter, by looking at the account creation dates.
From Fig. 2, we observe that 71% of them are actually created
before 2016. There are some interesting peaks, during 2016 and
2017: for instance, 24 accounts are created on July 12, 2016, ap-
prox. a week before the Republican National Convention (when
Donald Trump received the nomination), while 28 appear on
August 8, 2017, a few days before the infamous Unite the Right
rally in Charlottesville. Taken together, this might be evidence
of coordinated activities aimed at manipulating users’ opinions
with respect to specific events.
Account characteristics. We also shed light on the troll ac-
count profile information. In Table 1, we report the top ten
words appearing in the screen names and the descriptions of
Russian trolls, as well as character 4-grams for screen names
and word bigrams for profile descriptions. Interestingly, a sub-
stantial number of Russian trolls pose as news outlets, evident
from the use of the term “news” in both the screen name (1.3%)
and the description (10.7%). Also, it seems they attempt to in-
crease the number of their followers, thus their reach of Twit-
ter users, by nudging users to follow them (see, e.g., “follow
me” appearing in almost 8% of the accounts). Finally, 10.3%
of the Russian trolls describe themselves as Trump support-
ers: “trump” and “maga” (Make America Great Again, one of
Trump campaign’s main slogans).
Language. Looking at the language (as provided via the Twitter
API) of the tweets posted by Russian trolls, we find that most
of them (61%) are in English, although a substantial portion are
in Russian (27%), and to a lesser extent in German (3.5%). In
Fig. 3(a), we plot the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
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Figure 3: CDF of number of (a) languages used (b) clients used per
user.
Client (Trolls) (%) Client (Baseline) (%)
Twitter Web Client 50.1% TweetDeck 32.6%
twitterfeed 13.4% Twitter for iPhone 26.2%
Twibble.io 9.0% Twitter for Android 22.6%
IFTTT 8.6% Twitter Web Client 6.1%
TweetDeck 8.3% GrabInbox 2.0%
NovaPress 4.6% Twitter for iPad 1.4%
dlvr.it 2.3% IFTTT 1.0%
Twitter for iPhone 0.8% twittbot.net 0.9%
Zapier.com 0.6% Twitter for BlackBerry 0.6%
Twitter for Android 0.6% Mobile Web (M2) 0.4%
Table 2: Top 10 Twitter clients (as % of tweets).
of the number of different languages for each user: 64% of the
Russian trolls post all their tweets in only one language, com-
pared to only 54% for random users. Overall, by comparing the
two distributions, we observe that random Twitter users tend to
use more languages in their tweets compared to the trolls.
Client. Finally, we analyze the clients used to post tweets. We
do so since previous work [6] shows that the client used by of-
ficial or professional accounts are quite different that the ones
used by regular users. Table 2 reports the top 10 clients for both
Russian trolls and baseline users. We find the latter prefer to
use Twitter clients for mobile devices (48%) and the Tweet-
Deck dashboard (32%), whereas, the former mainly use the
Web client (50%). We also assess how many different clients
Russian trolls use throughout our dataset: in Fig. 3(b), we plot
the CDF of the number of clients used per user. We find that
65% of the Russian trolls use only one client, 28% of them two
different clients, and the rest more than three, which is overall
less than the random baseline users.
4.2 Geographical Analysis
Location. We then study users’ location, relying on the self-
reported location field in their profiles. Note that users not only
may leave it empty, but also change it any time they like, so
we look at locations for each tweet. We retrieve it for 75%
of the tweets by Russian trolls, gathering 261 different entries,
which we convert to a physical location using the Google Maps
Geocoding API. In the end, we obtain 178 unique locations
for the trolls, as depicted in Fig. 4 (red circles). The size of
the circles on the map indicates the number of tweets that ap-
pear at each location. We do the same for the baseline, getting
2,037 different entries, converted by the API to 894 unique lo-
cations. We observe that most of the tweets from Russian trolls
3
Figure 4: Distribution of reported locations for tweets by Russian trolls (red circles) and baseline (green triangles).
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Figure 5: CDF of the number of (a) characters and (b) words in each
tweet.
come from locations within the USA and Russia, and some
from European countries, like Germany, Belgium, and Italy.
On the other hand, tweets in our baseline are more uniformly
distributed across the globe, with many tweets from North and
South America, Europe, and Asia. This suggests that Russian
trolls may be pretending to be from certain countries, e.g., USA
or Germany, aiming to pose as locals and better manipulate
opinions. This explanation becomes more plausible when we
consider that a plurality of trolls’ tweets have their location set
as a generic form of “US,” as opposed to a specific city, state,
or even region. Interestingly, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most popu-
lar location for trolls to tweet from are Moscow, St. Petersburg,
and a generic form of “Russia.” We also assess whether users
change their country of origin based on the self-reported loca-
tion: only a negligible percentage (1%) of trolls change their
country, while for the baseline the percentage is 16%.
Timezone. We then study the timezone chosen by the users in
their account setting. In Table 3, we report the top 10 time-
zones for each dataset, in terms of the corresponding tweet vol-
umes. Two thirds of the tweets by trolls appear to be from US
timezones, while a substantial percentage (18%) from Russian
ones. Whereas, the baseline has a more diverse set of timezones,
which seems to mirror findings from our location analysis.
We also check whether users change their timezone set-
tings, finding that 7% of the Russian trolls do so two to three
times. The most popular changes are Berlin to Bern (18 times),
Nairobi to Moscow (10), and Nairobi to Volgograd (10).By con-
Timezone (Trolls) (%) Timezone (Baseline) (%)
Eastern Time 38.87% Athens 24.41%
Pacific Time 18.37% Pacific Time 21.41%
Volgograd 10.03% London 21.27%
Central Time 9.43% Tokyo 3.83%
Moscow 8.18% Central Time 3.75%
Bern 2.56% Eastern Time 2.10%
Minsk 2.06% Seoul 1.97%
Yerevan 1.96% Brasilia 1.97%
Nairobi 1.52% Buenos Aires 1.92%
Baku 1.29% Urumqi 1.50%
Table 3: Top 10 timezones (as % of tweets).
Trolls Baseline
Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%)
news 7.2% US 0.7% iHeartAwards 1.8% UrbanAttires 0.6%
politics 2.6% tcot 0.6% BestFanArmy 1.6% Vacature 0.6%
sports 2.1% PJNET 0.6% Harmonizers 1.0% mPlusPlaces 0.6%
business 1.4% entertainment 0.5% iOSApp 0.9% job 0.5%
money 1.3% top 0.5% JouwBaan 0.9% Directioners 0.5%
world 1.2% topNews 0.5% vacature 0.9% JIMIN 0.5%
MAGA 0.8% ISIS 0.4% KCA 0.9% PRODUCE101 0.5%
health 0.8% Merkelmussbleiben 0.4% Psychic 0.8% VoteMainFPP 0.5%
local 0.7% IslamKills 0.4% RT 0.8% Werk 0.4%
BlackLivesMatter 0.7% breaking 0.4% Libertad2016 0.6% dts 0.4%
Table 4: Top 20 hashtags in tweets from Russian trolls and baseline
users.
trast, this almost never happens for baseline accounts.
4.3 Content Analysis
Text. Next, we quantify the number of characters and words
contained in each tweet, and plot the corresponding CDF in
Fig. 5, finding that Russian trolls tend to post longer tweets.
Media. We then assess whether Russian trolls use images and
videos in a different way than random baseline users. For Rus-
sian trolls (resp., baseline accounts), 66% (resp., 73%) of the
tweets include no images, 32% (resp., 18%) exactly one im-
age, and 2% (resp., 9%) more than one. This suggests that Rus-
sian trolls disseminate a considerable amount of information
via single-image tweets. As for videos, only 1.5% of the tweets
from Russian trolls includes a video, as opposed to 6.4% for
baseline accounts.
4
Trolls Baseline
Mention (%) Mention (%) Mention (%) Mention (%)
leprasorium 2.1% postsovet 0.4% TasbihIstighfar 0.3% RasSpotlights 0.1%
zubovnik 0.8% DLGreez 0.4% raspotlights 0.2% GenderReveals 0.1%
realDonaldTrump 0.6% DanaGeezus 0.4% FunnyBrawls 0.2% TattedChanel 0.1%
midnight 0.6% ruopentwit 0.3% YouTube 0.2% gemvius 0.1%
blicqer 0.6% Spoontamer 0.3% Harry Styles 0.2% DrizzyNYC 0.1%
gloed up 0.6% YouTube 0.3% shortdancevids 0.2% August Alsina 0.1%
wylsacom 0.5% ChrixMorgan 0.3% UrbanAttires 0.2% RihannaBITCH 0.1%
TalibKweli 0.4% sergeylazarev 0.3% BTS twt 0.2% sexualfeed 0.1%
zvezdanews 0.4% RT com 0.3% KylieJenner NYC 0.2% PetsEvery30 0.1%
GiselleEvns 0.4% kozheed 0.3% BaddiessNation 0.2% IGGYAZALEAoO 0.1%
Table 5: Top 20 mentions in tweets from trolls and baseline.
Hashtags. Our next step is to study the use of hashtags in
tweets. Russian trolls use at least one hashtag in 32% of their
tweets, compared to 10% for the baseline. Overall, we find 4.3K
and 7.1K unique hashtags for trolls and random users, respec-
tively, with 74% and 78% of them only appearing once. In Ta-
ble 4, we report the top 20 hashtags for both datasets. Trolls
appear to use hashtags to disseminate news (7.2%) and politics
(2.6%) related content, but also use several that might be indica-
tors of propaganda and/or controversial topics, e.g., #ISIS, #Is-
lamKills, and #BlackLivesMatter. For instance, we find some
notable examples including: “We just have to close the bor-
ders, ‘refugees’ are simple terrorists #IslamKills” on March 22,
2016, “#SyrianRefugees ARE TERRORISTS from #ISIS #Is-
lamKills” on March 22, 2016, and “WATCH: Here is a typi-
cal #BlackLivesMatter protester: ‘I hope I kill all white babes!’
#BatonRouge <url>” on July 17, 2016.
We also study when these hashtags are used by the trolls,
finding that most of them are well distributed over time. How-
ever, there are some interesting exceptions, e.g., with #Merkel-
mussbleiben (a hashtag seemingly supporting Angela Merkel)
and #IslamKills. Specifically, tweets with the former appear ex-
clusively on July 21, 2016, while the latter on March 22, 2016,
when a terrorist attack took place at Brussels airport. These two
examples illustrate how the trolls may be coordinating to push
specific narratives on Twitter.
Mentions. We find that 46% of trolls’ tweets include mentions
to 8.5K unique Twitter users. This percentage is much higher
for the random baseline users (80%, to 41K users). Table 5 re-
ports the 20 top mentions we find in tweets from Russian trolls
and baseline users. We find several Russian accounts, like ‘lep-
rasorium’ (a popular Russian account that mainly posts memes)
in 2% of the mentions, as well as popular politicians like ‘real-
DonaldTrump’ (0.6%). The practice of mentioning politicians
on Twitter may reflect an underlying strategy to mutate users’
opinions regarding a particular political topic, which has been
also studied in previous work [3].
URLs. We then analyze the URLs included in the tweets. First
of all, we note that 53% of the trolls’ tweets include at least
a URL, compared to only 27% for the random baseline. There
is an extensive presence of URL shorteners for both datasets,
e.g., bit.ly (12% for trolls and 26% for the baseline) and ift.tt
(10% for trolls and 2% for the baseline), therefore, in Novem-
ber 2017, we visit each URL to obtain the final URL after
all redirections. In Fig. 6, we plot the CDF of the number of
URLs per unique domain. We observe that Russian trolls dis-
seminate more URLs in their tweets compared to the baseline.
Domain (Trolls) (%) Domain (Baseline) (%)
twitter.com 12.81% twitter.com 35.51%
reportsecret.com 7.02% youtube.com 4.21%
riafan.ru 3.42% vine.co 3.94%
politexpert.net 2.10% factissues.com 3.24%
youtube.com 1.88% blogspot.com.cy 1.92%
vk.com 1.58% instagram.com 1.90%
instagram.com 1.53% facebook.com 1.68%
yandex.ru 1.50% worldstarr.info 1.47%
infreactor.org 1.36% trendytopic.info 1.39%
cbslocal.com 1.35% minibird.jp 1.25%
livejournal 1.35% yaadlinksradio.com 1.24%
nevnov.ru 1.07% soundcloud.com 1.24%
ksnt.com 1.01% linklist.me 1.15%
kron4.com 0.93% twimg.com 1.09%
viid.me 0.93% appparse.com 1.08%
newinform.com 0.89% cargobayy.net 0.88%
inforeactor.ru 0.84% virralclub.com 0.84%
rt.com 0.81% tistory.com 0.50%
washigntonpost.com 0.75% twitcasting.tv 0.49%
seattletimes.com 0.73% nytimes.com 0.48%
Table 6: Top 20 domains included in tweets from Russian trolls and
baselines users.
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Figure 6: CDF of number of URLs per domain.
This might indicate that Russian trolls include URLs to increase
their credibility and positive user perception; indeed, [10] show
that adding a URL in a tweet correlates with higher credibil-
ity scores. Also, in Table 6, we report the top 20 domains for
both Russian trolls and the baseline. Most URLs point to con-
tent within Twitter itself; 13% and 35%, respectively. Links to
a number of popular social networks like YouTube (1.8% and
4.2%, respectively) and Instagram (1.5% and 1.9%) appear in
both datasets. We also note that among the top 20 domains,
there are also a number of news outlets linked from trolls’
tweets, e.g., Washington Post (0.7%), Seattle Times (0.7%), and
state-sponsored news outlets like RT (0.8%) in trolls’ tweets,
but much less so from the baseline.
Sentiment analysis. Next, we assess the sentiment and sub-
jectivity of each tweet for both datasets using the Pattern li-
brary [24]. Fig. 7(a) plots the CDF of the sentiment scores of
tweets posted by Russian trolls and our baseline users. We ob-
serve that 30% of the tweets from Russian trolls have a pos-
itive sentiment, and 18% negative. These scores are not too
distant from those of random users where 36% are positive
and 16% negative, however, Russian trolls exhibit a unique be-
havior in terms of sentiment, as a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test unveils significant differences between the dis-
tributions (p < 0.01). Overall, we observe that Russian trolls
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Figure 7: CDF of sentiment and subjectivity scores for tweets of Rus-
sian trolls and random users.
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Figure 8: CDF of the number of (a) followers/friends for each tweet
and (b) increase in followers/friends for each user from the first to the
last tweet.
tend to be more negative/neutral, while our baseline is more
positive. We also compare subjectivity scores (Fig. 7(b)), find-
ing that tweets from trolls tend to be more subjective; again,
we perform significance tests revealing differences between the
two distributions (p < 0.01).
LDA analysis. We also use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) model to analyze tweets’ semantics. We train an LDA
model for each of the datasets and extract 10 distinct topics
with 10 words, as reported in Table 7. Overall, topics from Rus-
sian trolls refer to specific world events (e.g., Charlottesville) as
well as specific news related to politics (e.g., North Korea and
Donald Trump). By contrast, topics extracted from the random
sample are more general (e.g., tweets regarding birthdays).
4.4 Account Evolution
Screen name changes. Previous work [20] has shown that
malicious accounts often change their screen name in order to
assume different identifies. Therefore, we investigate whether
trolls show a similar behavior, as they might change the narra-
tive with which they are attempting to influence public opin-
ion. Indeed, we find that 9% of the accounts operated by trolls
change their screen name, up to 4 times during the course of our
dataset. Some examples include changing screen names from
“OnlineHouston” to “HoustonTopNews,” or “Jesus Quintin
Perez” to “WorldNewsPolitics,” in a clear attempt to pose as
news-related accounts. In our baseline, we find that 19% of the
accounts changed their Twitter screen names, up to 11 times
during our dataset; highlighting that changing screen names is
a common behavior of Twitter users in general.
Followers/Friends. Next, we look at the number of follow-
ers and friends (i.e., the accounts one follows) of the Russian
trolls, as this is an indication of the overall impact of a tweet.
In Fig. 8(a), we plot the CDF of the number of followers per
tweet measured at the time of that tweet. On average, Russian
trolls have 7K followers and 3K friends, while our baseline has
25K followers and 6K friends. We also note that in both sam-
ples, tweets reached a large number of Twitter users; at least 1K
followers, with peaks up to 145K followers. These results high-
light that Russian trolls have a non-negligible number of fol-
lowers, which can assist in pushing specific narratives to a much
greater number of Twitter users. We also assess the evolution of
the Russian trolls in terms of the number of their followers and
friends. To this end, we get the follower and friend count for
each user on their first and last tweet and calculate the differ-
ence. Fig. 8(b) plots the CDF of the increase/decrease of the fol-
lowers and friends for each troll as well as random user in our
baseline. We observe that, on average, Russian trolls increase
their number of followers and friends by 2,065 and 1,225, re-
spectively, whereas for the baseline we observe an increase of
425 and 133 for followers and friends, respectively. This sug-
gests that Russian trolls work hard to increase their reachability
within Twitter.
Tweet Deletion. Arguably, a reasonable strategy to avoid de-
tection after posting tweets that aim to manipulate other users
might be to delete them. This is particularly useful when troll
accounts change their identity and need to modify the narra-
tive that they use to influence public opinion. With each tweet,
the Streaming API returns the total number of available tweets
a user has up to that time. Retrieving this count allows us to
observe if a user has deleted a tweet, and around what period;
we call this an “observed deletion.” Recall that our dataset is
based on the 1% sample of Twitter, thus, we can only estimate,
in a conservative way, how many tweets are deleted; specifi-
cally, in between subsequent tweets, a user may have deleted
and posted tweets that we do not observe. In Fig. 9, we plot
the CDF of the number of deleted tweets per observed dele-
tion. We observe that 13% of the Russian trolls delete some of
their tweets, with a median percentage of tweet deletion equal
to 9.7%. Whereas, for the baseline set, 27% of the accounts
delete at least one tweet, but the median percentage is 0.1%.
This means that the trolls delete their tweets in batches, possi-
bly trying to cover their tracks or get a clean slate, while random
users make a larger number of deletions but only a small per-
centage of their overall tweets, possibly because of typos. We
also report the distribution, over each month, of tweet deletions
in Fig. 10. Specifically, we report the mean of the percentages
for all observed deletions in our datasets. Most of the tweets
from Russian trolls are deleted in October 2016, suggesting that
these accounts attempted to get a clean slate a few months be-
fore the 2016 US elections.
4.5 Case Study
While the previous results provide a quantitative character-
ization of Russian trolls behavior, we believe there is value
showing a concrete example of the behavior exhibited and how
techniques played out. We start on May 15, 2016, where the
troll with screen name ‘Pen Air’, was posing as a news ac-
count via its profile description: “National American news.” On
September 8, 2016 as the US presidential elections approached,
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Topic Terms (Trolls) Topic Terms (Baseline)
1 trump, black, people, really, one, enlist, truth, work, can, get 1 want, can, just, follow, now, get, see, don, love, will
2 trump, year, old, just, run, obama, breaking, will, news, police 2 2016, july, come, https, trump, social, just, media, jabberduck, get
3 new, trump, just, breaking, obamacare, one, sessions, senate, politics, york 3 happy, best, make, birthday, video, days, come, back, still, little
4 man, police, news, killed, shot, shooting, woman, dead, breaking, death 4 know, never, get, love, just, night, one, give, time, can
5 trump, media, tcot, just, pjnet, war, like, video, post, hillary 5 just, can, everyone, think, get, white, fifth, veranomtv2016, harmony, friends
6 sports, video, game, music, isis, charlottesville, will, new, health, amb 6 good, like, people, lol, don, just, look, today, said, keep
7 can, don, people, want, know, see, black, get, just, like 7 summer, seconds, team, people, miss, don, will, photo, veranomtv2016, new
8 trump, clinton, politics, hillary, video, white, donald, president, house, calls 8 like, twitter, https, first, can, get, music, better, wait, really
9 news, world, money, business, new, one, says, state, 2016, peace 9 dallas, right, fuck, vote, police, via, just, killed, teenchoice, aldubmainecelebration
10 now, trump, north, korea, people, right, will, check, just, playing 10 day, black, love, thank, great, new, now, matter, can, much
Table 7: Terms extracted from LDA topics of tweets from Russian trolls and baseline users.
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Figure 9: CDF of the number of deleted tweets per observe deletion.
201
6-0
1
201
6-0
2
201
6-0
3
201
6-0
4
201
6-0
5
201
6-0
6
201
6-0
7
201
6-0
8
201
6-0
9
201
6-1
0
201
6-1
1
201
6-1
2
201
7-0
1
201
7-0
2
201
7-0
3
201
7-0
4
201
7-0
5
201
7-0
6
201
7-0
7
201
7-0
8
201
7-0
9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
M
ed
ia
n 
%
 o
f d
el
et
ed
 tw
ee
ts Russian Trolls
Baseline
Figure 10: Average percentage of observed deletions per month.
‘Pen Air’ became a Trump supporter, changing its screen name
to ‘Blacks4DTrump’ with a profile description of “African-
Americans stand with Trump to make America Great Again!”
Over the next 11 months, the account’s tweet count grew from
49 to 642 while its follower count rose from 1.2K to nearly 9K.
Then, around August 18, 2017, the account was seemingly re-
purposed. Almost all of its previous tweets were deleted (the ac-
count’s tweet count dropped to 35), it gained a new screen name
(‘southlonestar2’), and was now posing as a “Proud American
and TEXAN patriot! Stop ISLAM and PC. Don’t mess with
Texas” according to its profile description. When examining the
accounts tweets, we see that most are clearly related to pol-
itics, featuring blunt right-wing attacks and “talking points.”
For example, “Mr. Obama! Maybe you bring your girls and
leave them in the bathroom with a grown man! #bathroom-
bill #NObama <url>” on May 15, 2016, “#HiLIARy has only
two faces! And I hate both! #NeverHillary #Hillaryliesmatter
<url>” on May 19, 2016, and “RT @TEN GOP: WikiLeaks
#DNCLeaks confirms something we all know: system is totally
rigged! #NeverHillary <url>.” on July 22, 2016.
4.6 Take-aways
In summary, our analysis leads to the following observations.
/pol/ Reddit Twitter Trolls
URLs Russian state-sponsored 6 13 19 19
Other news sources 47 168 159 192
All 127 482 861 989
Events Russian state-sponsored 19 42 118 19
Other news sources 720 3,055 2,930 195
All 1,685 9,531 1,537,612 1,461
Mean λ0 Russian state-sponsored 0.0824 0.1865 0.2264 0.1228
Other news sources 0.0421 0.1447 0.1544 0.0663
All 0.0324 0.1557 0.1553 0.0753
Table 8: Total URLs with at least one event in Twitter, /pol/, Reddit,
and Russian trolls on Twitter; total events for Russian state-sponsored
news URLs, other news URLs and all the URLs; and mean background
rate (λ0) for each platform.
First, we find evidence that trolls were actively involved in the
dissemination of content related to world news and politics, as
well as propaganda content regarding various topics such as
ISIS and Islam. Moreover, several Russian trolls were created
or repurposed a few weeks before notable world events, includ-
ing the Republican National Convention meeting or the Char-
lottesville rally. We also find that the trolls deleted a substan-
tial amount of tweets in batches and overall made substantial
changes to their accounts during the course of their lifespan.
Specifically, they changed their screen names aiming to pose
as news outlets, experienced significant rises in the numbers of
followers and friends, etc. Furthermore, our location analysis
shows that Russian trolls might have tried to manipulate users
located in the USA, Germany, and possibly in their own coun-
try (i.e., Russia), by appearing to be located in those countries.
Finally, the fact that these accounts were active up until their
recent suspension also highlights the need to develop more ef-
fective tools to detect such actors.
5 Influence Estimation
Thus far, we have analyzed the behavior of the Russian trolls on
the Twitter platform, and how this differs from that of a base-
line of random users. Allegedly, their main goal is to ultimately
manipulate the opinion of other users and extend the cascade
of disinformation they share (e.g., other users post similar con-
tent) [5]. Therefore, we now set out to shed light on their im-
pact, in terms of the dissemination of disinformation, on Twitter
and on the greater Web.
To assess their influence, we look at the URLs posted by four
groups of users: Russian trolls on Twitter, “normal” accounts
on Twitter, Reddit users, and 4chan users (/pol/ board). For
each unique URL, we fit a statistical model known as Hawkes
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/pol/ Reddit Twitter Trolls
Destination
/pol/
Reddit
Twitter
Trolls
So
ur
ce
0.1200.1240.1250.127
0.1140.1290.1670.106
0.0750.2630.0830.064
0.1200.1250.1160.108
(a) All URLs
/pol/ Reddit Twitter Trolls
Destination
/pol/
Reddit
Twitter
Trolls
R: 0.0809
O: 0.1110
-27.1%
R: 0.1043
O: 0.1205
-13.4%
R: 0.1286
O: 0.1224
5.1%
R: 0.1016
O: 0.1328
-23.5%*
R: 0.1240
O: 0.1224
1.3%
R: 0.1309
O: 0.1393
-6.0%
R: 0.1144
O: 0.1969
-41.9%
R: 0.1040
O: 0.0992
4.8%
R: 0.0969
O: 0.0815
18.9%
R: 0.1783
O: 0.2465
-27.7%
R: 0.1086
O: 0.1252
-13.2%
R: 0.0848
O: 0.0825
2.7%
R: 0.1150
O: 0.1157
-0.6%
R: 0.1668
O: 0.1113
49.8%**
R: 0.0995
O: 0.1130
-11.9%
R: 0.0658
O: 0.1144
-42.5%
(b) News URLs
Figure 11: Mean weights for (a) all URLs in our dataset and (b) news
URLs categorized as Russian state-sponsored (R) and other main-
stream and alternative news URLs (O). We also show the percent of
increase/decrease between the two categories. Note that * and ** refer
to statistical significance with, resp., p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
Processes [18, 19], which allows us to estimate the strength
of connections between each of these four groups in terms of
how likely an event – the URL being posted by either trolls or
normal users to a particular platform – is to cause subsequent
events in each of the groups. For example, a strong connection
from Reddit to /pol/ would mean that a URL that appears on
Reddit is likely to be seen and then re-posted on /pol/; whereas,
a weak connection from trolls to normal users on Twitter indi-
cates that a URL posted by trolls is less likely to be re-tweeted
or re-posted by the latter. We fit the Hawkes Processes using the
methodology presented by [34].
To study the dissemination of different types of content, we
look at three different sets of URLs: 1) The complete set of
all URLs posted by Russian trolls; 2) The subset of URLs for
Russian state-sponsored news, namely, RT (Russia Today); and
3) The subset of URLs from other mainstream and alternative
news sources using the list provided by [34]. Table 8 sum-
marizes the number of URLs, number of events (i.e., occur-
rences of a given URL) as well as the mean background rate
for each category and social network. The background rate de-
fines the rate at which events occur excluding the influence
of the platforms included in the model; the background rate
includes events created spontaneously on each platform, such
as by a user sharing the article from the original source, or
those generated by another platform not monitored by us like
Facebook. The number of events for Russian state-sponsored
news sources is substantially lower than the number of events
from other news sources. This is expected since the former
/pol/ Reddit Twitter  Trolls
Destination
/pol/
Reddit
Twitter
 Trolls
So
ur
ce
3.27%0.01%4.10%
18.08%0.06%28.94%
48.40%10.98%12.19%
0.01%0.62%0.93%
(a) All URLs
/pol/ Reddit Twitter Trolls
Destination
/pol/
Reddit
Twitter
Trolls
R: 5.32%
O: 9.07%
-3.75
R: 0.71%
O: 1.17%
-0.46
R: 5.74%
O: 8.15%
-2.41
R: 13.20%
O: 57.15%
-43.95
R: 5.57%
O: 12.22%
-6.64
R: 4.78%
O: 46.78%
-41.99
R: 43.84%
O: 51.53%
-7.68
R: 16.66%
O: 10.49%
6.17
R: 24.90%
O: 9.14%
15.75
R: 2.69%
O: 0.61%
2.07
R: 3.13%
O: 0.62%
2.51
R: 1.38%
O: 0.72%
0.66
(b) News URLs
Figure 12: Estimated mean percentages of events created because of
other events for (a) all URLs and (b) Russian state-sponsored URLs
(R) and other mainstream and alternative news URLs (O). We also
show the difference between the two categories of news.
only includes one news source (RT), however, it is interesting
that the background rates for these URLs are higher than for
other news sources, meaning that events from Russian state-
sponsored news are more likely to occur spontaneously.
Fitting a Hawkes model yields a weight matrix, which char-
acterizes the strength of the connections between the groups
we study. Each weight value represents the connection strength
from one group to another and can be interpreted as the ex-
pected number of subsequent events that will occur on the sec-
ond group after each event on the first. The mean weight val-
ues over all URLs, as well as for the URLs from RT and other
news URLs, are presented in Fig. 11. We observe that for /pol/,
Reddit, and normal users on Twitter, the greatest weights are
from each group to itself, meaning that reposts/retweets on
the same site are more common than sharing the URL to the
other platforms (Fig. 11(a)). For the Russian Trolls on Twitter,
however, the weight is greater from the trolls to Twitter than
from the trolls to themselves, perhaps reflecting their use as an
avenue for disseminating information to normal Twitter users
(Fig. 11(b)). Also, we observe that, in most cases, the connec-
tions are stronger for non-Russia state-sponsored news, indicat-
ing that regular users are more inclined to share news articles
from mainstream and alternative news sources.
Looking at the Russian trolls and normal Twitter users, we
see that the trolls are more likely to retweet Russian state-
sponsored URLs from normal Twitter users than other news
sources; conversely, normal Twitter users are more likely to
retweet Russian state-sponsored URLs from the troll accounts.
In order to assess the significance of our results, we per-
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form two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the weight
distributions for the RT URLs and the other news URLs for
each source-destination platform pair (depicted as stars in the
Fig. 11(b)). Small p value means there is a statistically sig-
nificant difference in the way that RT URLs propagate from
the source to the destination platform. Most of the source-
destination pairs have no statistical significance, however for
the Russian trolls–Twitter users pair, we find statistically sig-
nificance difference with p < 0.01.
In Fig. 12, we report the estimated total impact for each
pair of platforms, for both Russian state-sponsored news, other
news sources as well as all the observed URLs. We determine
the impact by calculating, based on the estimated weights and
the number of events, the percentage of events on a destina-
tion platform caused by events on a source platform, following
the same methodology as [34]. For all URLs (Fig. 12(a)), we
find that the influence of Russian trolls is negligible on Twitter
(0.01%), while for /pol/ and Reddit it is slightly higher (0.93%
and 0.62%, respectively). For other pairs, the larger impacts are
between Reddit–/pol/ and Twitter-Russian trolls, mainly due to
the larger population of users. Looking at the estimated impact
for RT and other news sources (Fig. 12(b)), we note that the
trolls influenced the other platforms approximately the same
for alternative and mainstream news sources (0.72%, 0.62%,
and 0.61 for /pol/, Reddit, and Twitter, respectively). Interest-
ingly, Russian trolls have a much larger impact on all the other
platforms for the RT news when compared to the other news
sources: approximately 2 times more on /pol/, 5 times more on
Reddit, and 4 times more on Twitter.
Take-aways. Using Hawkes processes, we were able to assess
the degree of influence Russian trolls had on Twitter, Reddit,
and /pol/ by examining the diffusion of information via URLs
to news. Our results indicate that their influence is actually quite
limited. With the exception of news originating from the Rus-
sian state-sponsored news outlet RT, the troll accounts were
generally less influential than other users on Reddit, Twitter,
and 4chan. However, our analysis is based only on 1K troll ac-
counts found in Twitter’s 1% stream, and, as mentioned previ-
ously, Twitter recently announced they had discovered over 1K
more trolls and more than 50K automated accounts. With that in
mind, there are several potential explanations behind this lim-
ited influence. For example, there might be a lot of influence
attributed to regular Twitter users that belongs to newly an-
nounced troll accounts. Considering that Twitter announced the
discovery of “only” 1K more troll accounts, we suspect that this
is not really the case. Another, more plausible explanation is
that the troll accounts are just not terribly efficient at spreading
news, and instead are more concerned with causing havoc by
pushing ideas, engaging other users, or even taking both sides
of controversial online discussions [26]. This scenario makes
more sense considering that, along with 1K new troll accounts,
Twitter also announced discovering over 50K automated ac-
counts that might be more efficient in terms of driving traffic to
specific URLs.
6 Related Work
We now review previous work on opinion manipulation, po-
litically motivated disinformation on the Web, and analysis of
state-sponsored trolls’ behavior.
Opinion manipulation. The practice of swaying opinion on
the Web is a long-standing issue as malicious actors attempt
to push their agenda. Kumar et al. [16] study how users cre-
ate multiple accounts, called sockpuppets, that participate in
Web communities to manipulate users’ opinions. They find that
sockpuppets exhibit different posting behavior when compared
to benign users. Mihaylov et al. [21] show that trolls can ma-
nipulate users’ opinions in forums, while in their follow-up
work [22] they highlight the two types of manipulation trolls:
those paid to operate and those that are called out as such by
other users. Then, Volkova and Bell [30] predict the deletion of
Twitter accounts because they are trolls, focusing on those that
shared content related to the Russian-Ukraine crisis. Elyashar
et al. [7] distinguish authentic discussions from campaigns to
manipulate the public’s opinion, using a set of similarity func-
tions alongside historical data. Finally, Varol et al. [29] identify
memes that become popular due to coordinated efforts, and
achieve 0.75 AUC score before memes become trending and
0.95 afterwards.
False information on the political stage. Conover et al. [3]
study the interactions of right- and left-leaning communities
on Twitter during the 2010 US midterm elections, finding that
the retweet network has limited connectivity between the two
communities, which does not happen in the mentions network;
mainly because users engage others users with different ide-
ologies and expose them to different opinions. Ratkiewicz et
al. [23] use machine learning to detect the early stages of
false political information spreading on Twitter and introduce
a framework that considers topological, content-based, and
crowdsourced features of the information diffusion. Wong et
al. [31] quantify political leaning of users and news outlets dur-
ing the 2012 US presidential election on Twitter by using an
inference engine that considers tweeting and retweeting behav-
ior of articles. Yang et al. [32] investigate the topics of dis-
cussions on Twitter for 51 US political persons showing that
Democrats and Republicans are active in a similar way on
Twitter. Le et al. [17] study 50M tweets regarding the 2016
US election primaries and highlight the importance of three
factors in political discussions on social media, namely the
party, policy considerations, and personality of the candidates.
Howard and Kollanyi [13] study the role of bots in Twitter con-
versations during the 2016 Brexit referendum. By analyzing
1.5M tweets, they find that most tweets are in favor of Brexit
and that there are bots with various levels of automation.Also,
Hegelich and Janetzko [11] highlight that bots have a politi-
cal agenda and that they exhibit various behaviors, e.g., trying
to hide their identity and promoting topics through hashtags
and retweets. Finally, a large body of work focuses on social
bots [1, 4, 9, 8, 28] and their role in spreading disinformation,
highlighting that they can manipulate the public’s opinion at
large scale, thus potentially affecting the outcome of political
elections.
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State-sponsored trolls. Recent work aim to uncover the behav-
ior of state-sponsored trolls on the Web by analyzing ground
truth datasets identified independently by social network op-
erators like Facebook and Twitter. Specifically, Zannettou et
al. [35] analyze a set of 10M posts by Russian and Iranian trolls
on Twitter shedding light into their campaigns, their targets,
and how their campaigns/targets/behavior change over time. In
follow-up work, Zannettou et al. [33] focus on the dissemina-
tion of images by Russian trolls on Twitter. They analyze 1.8M
images finding that the dissemination of images is tightly cou-
pled with real-world events and that the shared images were
mainly related to politics and world news with a focus on Russia
and USA. Also, Steward et al. [26] focus on discussions related
to the Black Lives Matter movement and how content from
Russian trolls was retweeted by other users. Using the retweet
network, they find the existence of two communities; one left-
and one right-leaning communities. Also, they note that trolls
infiltrated both communities, setting out to push specific narra-
tives. Im et al. [14] focus on detecting Twitter users that likely
act on behalf of the Russian Internet Research Agency (i.e.,
they are Russian trolls). To do this, they use conventional ma-
chine learning techniques with a set of handcrafted features. By
running the proposed classifier to an out-of-sample set of users
they find that Russian trolls are still very active on the Web. Kim
et al [15] study the temporal traces of Russian trolls on Twitter
finding cooperation between several trolls, substantial interplay
between right and left leaning trolls, and that trolls have multi-
ple agendas to disturb democracy in western countries. Finally,
Boyd et al. [2] perform a linguistic analysis on tweets from Rus-
sian trolls during the 2016 US elections: they find that trolls
were targeting differently right and left leaning communities
on Twitter and that their tweets were linguistically unique when
compared to controlled-sample of english-speaking accounts.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the behavior and use of the Twit-
ter platform by Russian trolls during the course of 21 months.
We showed that Russian trolls exhibited interesting differences
when compared with a set of random users, actively dissemi-
nated politics-related content, adopted multiple identities dur-
ing their account’s lifespan, and that they aimed to increase
their impact on Twitter by increasing their followers. Also,
we quantified the influence that Russian trolls have on Twitter,
Reddit, and /pol/ using a statistical model known as Hawkes
Processes. Our findings show that trolls’ influence was not sub-
stantial with respect to the other platforms, with the significant
exception of news published by the Russian state-sponsored
news outlet RT.
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